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Federa'l  Reserve  System.Daylight  Overdrafts:  who  Really  Bears  the  Risk?
The  prob]em  of  payment  system  risk  has  been  addressed  by
numerous  government  and  private  sector  task  forces  over  a  period
of  years.  New regulation  of  the  large  dollar  transfer  systems
has  reduced  the  level  of  risk,  but  the  magnitude  of  the  risk
continues  to  be  massive.  The  high  Level-  of  daylight  overdrafts,
the  basic  source  of  paynent  system  ri.sk,  is  a  direct  result  fron
the  externality  that  the  creator  of  the  overdraft  does  not  bear
the  ful1  cost  of  the  overdraft.  pol-icy  makers  are  concerned,
however,  that  programs  designed  to  linit  the  risk  may  interfere
with  the  economyrs  ability  to  carry  out  transactions  and  reduce
real  economic  growth.  In  attenpting  to  balance  these  two  issues,
the  externality  and  the  abiJ-ity  to  execute  payments,  most
economists  argue  that  the  Federal  Reserve  needs  to  price  daylight
overdrafts  to  reduce  the  externality  in  creating  these  overdrafts
and  thereby  to  reduce  pa)rment  system  risk.
While  there  is  payrnent  system  risk,  the  size  of  the  risk  is
unknown.  Current  measures  of  the  rj-sk  are  inadequate  and
inconplete.  Furthernore,  the  issue  of  who  is  actually  bearing
this  risk  j-s  not  usually  explicitly  considered  in  the  analysis  of2
the  risk  problem.  The  cost  of  these  daylight  overdrafts  is  at
Ieast  partially  borne  by  the  tax-paying  public.  Pricinq  the
extension  of  intraday  credit  would  be  an  excell-ent  approach  to
liniting  riski  however,  a  market  determined  price  for  this  credit
is  more  like].y  to  properly  allocate  this  risk  than  a  government
determined  price.  Federal  Reserve  pricing  of  daylight  overdrafts
would  likely  be  an  J,mprovement  over  the  current  si.tuation,  but  it
lrtouLd offer  only  a  second-best  soLution.
This  paper  begins  with  a  brief  explanation  of  the  rnechanics
of  the  pa)rnent  system,  the  source  and  size  of  the  risks,  and  a
description  of  the  current  policies  for  reducing  risk  and  their
effectiveness.  Following  this  introduction  is  an  analysis  of
which  parties  would  actually  be  exposed  to  .tross in  the  event  of  a
paynent  system  failure.  This  analysis  is  followed  by  a
discussion  of  some princj-ples  that.wou1d  be  useful  as  gui-des  in
reforming  the  paynent  system  to  reduce  the  existing  risk.  The
paper  will  end  lrith  a  brief  sunmary  of  the  conclusions.
l-.  Background  and  l"lechanics  of  Large  Dotlar  pa)4nent  Systems
Specialized  payment  systerns  for  large  dollar  sums  have
developed  in  response  to  the  demands  of  transactors.  These
specialized  systems  differ  frorn  normal  check  clearing  payment
systerns  in  three  ways:  security,  speed  and  finality.  Because
transactors  value  increased  security  when  rnaking  extremely
large  paluents,  they  use  systems  that  include  more  safequards
against  accidental  loss  or  theft.  Sinilarly,  the  val-ue  j-n
increasing  the  speed  of  conpletingf  a  pa)ment  is  in  proportion  toits  size.  The  cost  of  float 
".rr-O" 
most  effectively  reduced  by
speeding  the  payment  process  and  reducinq  or  eliminating  the
float  that  might  have  occurred  on  the  l-argest  payments.
FinaLly,  transactors  place  greater  value  on  finality  when the
pa)qnents  are'extremely  large.  Most-  1arge  dol1ar  payments
systems  provide  either  final  payment  at  the  time  of  the
transaction  or  greatly  reduce  the  time  untj-I  the  final  transfer
of  funds  is  cornpleted  (Hunphrey  1984).
Large  dollar  paynent  systerns  act  as  a  conduit  to  transfer
funds  between  buyers  and  sellers.  As  many  as  five  entities  are
involved  in  large  dollar  payments.  The  sender  is  the  person  or
corporation  that  wishes  to  transfer  funds  to  a.receiver,  another
individual  or  corporation,  usually  in  payrnent  for  goods,
services,  or  securities  received.  The  sender  notifies  its  bank,
known  as  the  sendinq  bank,  to.debit  the.senderrg  account  and
transfer  the  funds  to  the  receiver.  The  sending  bank  notifies
the  transfer  system  to  debit  the  sending  bankrs  account,  to
credit  the  receivinq  bankts  account,  and  to  pass  the  payment
information  on  to  the  receiving  bank.  The  receiving  bank  then
credits  the  receiverrs  account  and  notifies  the  receiver  of  the
transfer.  Thus,  the  five  entities  invoLved  in  the  transfer  are
the  sender,  the  sending  bank,  the  transfer  system,  the  receiving
bank,  and  the  receiver.  Banks  also  transfer  funds  for  their  own
purposes,  often  to  other  banks.  fn  these  transfers,  the  sender
and  the  sending  bank  are  one  and  the  same  as  are  the  receiver  and
the  receiving  bank.
There  are  two  inportant  large  dol"Lar  pa)rment  systems  in  the
United  States:  Fedwire  and  Clearing  House  Interbank  Payment4
system.  Fedwire  is  the  transfer  systen  operated  by  the  Federal
Reserve  System  and  has  existed  in  various  forms  since  1"918.
Fedwire  transactions  are  split  between  funds  transfers  and  book-
entry  securities.  The  average  daily  volune  on  Fedwire  in  the
second  quarter*  of  1988  was  $605  bill-iorf  in'funds  transfers  and  an
additional  $358  billion  in  book-entry  securities  transfers.
Averagfe  daily  palment  volume  is  plotted  in  chart  t-.  Fedwire
conducts  an  average  of  55 million  transactions  per  year  and
serves  1L,000  participating  institutions.  (Fedwire  can  be
accessed  by  banks,  saving  and  loan  associations,  and  credit
unions.  To  sinplify  the  exposition,  a1l  participants  will  be
referred  to  as  banks.)  Based  upon  a  study  by  the  Federal  Reserve
Bank  of  New York,  transfers  on  Fedhrire  are  concentrated  in
federal  funds  (33.5  percent  of  the  total  dollars  transferred),
securities  transactions  (27.8  percent  of  the  total),  and
commercial  and  niscellaneous  payrnents  (L7,0  percent  of  the
total  ) .
Fedwire  is  unique  in  providing  gross  settlenent  services  in
the  United  States.  In  a  gross  settLement  system,  each  paynent  is
a  bilateral  exchange  bethreen  two  participants  where  the  funds  are
actually  transfered  bet!,reen  the  two  participants  when  the
transfer  nessage  is  sent.  Within  Fedwire,  gross  settlenent
reguires  the  reserve  accounts  at  the  Federal  Reserve  Banks  to  be
credited  or  debited  at  the  t j-rne of  the  transfer,  though  the
debiting  can  create  a  negative  balance  in  a  reserve  account.
This  approach  provides  settlement  finality  to  the  participants,
i.e,,  funds  are  irrevocable  credits  to  receivers.  once  the
transfer  is  cornpleted,  the  Fed  has  no  recourse  to  the  receiver  toChart  1
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The Fed's  only  recourse  is  with  the  sending
The  other  major  large  dol-lar  payment  system  is  the  New York
Clearing  House  Associationts  Clearing  House  fnterbank  Payment
System  (CHIPS);  which  was -formed  in  l-970.  orlgrinalty,  cHIpS  was
j-ntended  to  handle  international  transactions,  which  still  nakes
up  the  majority  of  its  business,  but  it  non  also  handfes
domestic  transactions.  CHIPS had  an  average  daily  volurne  of  $635
billion  in  the  second  quarter  of  l-988  and  served  approxinately
l-40 bank6.  (See Chart  1.)  There  is  relatively  little  overlap
between  CHIPS  and  Fedr,rire.  cHlps  is  more  heavily  concentrated  j_n
international  transactions,  handling  99  percent  of  the  foreign
exchange  market  and  75  percent  of  the  Eurodollar  placement
market.  These  tero  markets  account  for  82  percent  of  the  total
dol-l-ar  volume  transferred  on  CHfpS.
cHIPs  utilizes  net  net  settlement  (Mengle  1985).  Net  net
settlement  differs  from  gross  settlement  in  that  the  actual
transfer  of  funds  occurs  only  once  per  day.  In  addition,  net  net
settlenent  greatly  reduces  the  nurnber  of  transfers  of  funds  that
must  be  made  to  complete  paynents.  The  single  palrment  needed  for
settlement  is  calculated  as  the  sum of  a]l  paFlents  received,
which  represent  credits,  less  the  sum of  a]l  payments  sent,  which
represent  debits.  If  pal.nents  received  exceed  payments  sent,
then  a  participant  is  in  a  net  credit  position.  Atternatively,
if  payments  sent  exceed  payrnents  received,  then  a  participant  is
in  a  net  debit  posj-tion,  At  the  end  of  the  day,  banks  in  a  net
debit  position  rnake a  single  payrnent  through  Fedwire  to  the  CHfpS
settlernent  account,  After  participants  with  net  debit  positions5
have  made  their  paynents,  funds  are  then  transferred  through  the
Fedwire  to  those  CHIPS  participants  in  a  net  credit  position.
2.  Risk  within  the  Paynent  System
Palment  system  risk  results  from  the  extension  of  intraday
credit.  on  Fedvire  this  intraday  credit  tiakes  -thd  form  of
daylight  overdrafts.  A  daylight  overdraft  occurs  whenever  a
sending  bank  sends  more  funds  than  it  currently  has  in  its
reserve  account,  i.e.  the  sendj-ng  bankrs  reserve  account  has  a
negative  balance.  This  overdrafting  is  permitted  under
Regulation  J.  It  treats  the  transfer  of  funds  as  final  for  the
receiving  bank  and  stipulates  that  the  sending  bank  must  have
sufficient  funds  to  cover  its  reserve  accounts  at  the  end  of  the
day.  The  Fed  does  have  the  right  to  refuse  to  conduct  a  transfer
if  it  has  reason  to  believe  that  the  transfer  will  create  an
overdraft.  Under  normal  circunstances,  however,  tbe  Fed  does  not
exercise  this  right,  If  a  bank  with  an  overdraft  were  to  fail
during  the  day,  the  Fed  would  be  another  unsecured  creditor  and
would  likely  face  a  loss.
The  Federal  Reserve  permits  daylight  overdrafts  because  it
believes  intraday  credit  provides  a  more  efficient  payrnent
mechanism.  In  its  reportr  ttControlling  Risk  in  the  palraent
Systemrr  the  Task  Force  on  Controlling  payment  System  Risk  stated
that  intraday  credit  alLo$rs  payrnents  to  be  conpleted  at  a  lolrer
cost  and  faster  than  would  occur  if  intraday  credit  lras  not
pernitted.  The  Task  Force  also  recognized  that  extending
intraday  credit  is  costly,  especially  in  terms  of  risk.  It
concl-uded  that  a  careful  analysis  of  the  costs  and  benefits  isI
needed  in  order  to  detennine  the  optinal  guantity  of  intraday
credit  for  the  economy.l
The  Federal  Reserve  treats  overdrafts  resulting  from  book-
entry  securities  transactions  quite  differently  than  those
occuring'  in  funds  transfers.  The  ovdrArafts  created  by  book-
entry  security  transactions  are  not  controlled  by  the  Fedts  risk
reduction  programs.  Two  reasons  are  given  for  this  different
treatment.  First,  the  Fed  is  concerned  about  any  regufation  of
the  government  securities  market  that  night  interfere  with  its
execution  of  monetary  policy.  The  speed  and  low  cost  of
'transactions  that  result  from  permitting  intraday  credit  are
highly  valued  in  the  execution  of  open  market  operations  to
achieve  monetary  qoals.  Second,  it  is  arg.ued. that  these
transaction  are  collateral,ized  by  the  value  of  the  government
securities,  and  consequently  the  transactions  are  not  risky.
Essentially,  the  social  gain  of  intraday  credit  is  perceived  to
exceed  by  far  the  social  costs  in  this  case.  Ilereafter,
references  to  Fedwire  in  this  paper  pertain  only  to  the  funds
transfer  component  unless  specifically  noted,
Overdrafting  is  possible  on  a  gross  settlement  system  but
not  on  a  net  settlenent  system.  As  mentioned  previously,  CHIPS
is  a  net  settlement  system.  Daylight  overdrafts,  in  a  strict
sense,  do  not  occur  in  the  cHIpS  system  because  the  paynent
messages  transferred  by  CHIPS  represent  payment  inforrnation  and
an  irrevoable  obligation  to  transfer  the  required  funds  to  settle
the  paynent  at  the  end  of  the  day.  Consequently,  the  receivingT
bank  is  a  credj-tor  of  the  sending  bank  during  the  day,  i.e.  it
extends  intraday  credit  to  the  sendingr  bank,  The  risk  in  theseI
pa]4fients  is  exacerbated  by  the  common practice  of  pernittingr
receiving  custorners  access  to  these  provisional  funds  prior  to
the  final  settl-ement.  If  these  funds  are  transferred  out  of  the
receiving  bank  before  settlement,  it  would  be  difficult  for  the
receiving'balk  to  tetrieve  the  funds  from  its  customer  if  the
sending  bank  failed  to  settle.  If  a  CHIPS participant  failed  to
make  settlement,  other  participants  who  had  received  funds  from
the  failed  participant  would  have  to  atternpt  to  retrieve  the
funds  from  their  customers  who  were  the  receivers.  In  the  short
run  before  the  retrieval  night  be  accomplished,  settlenent  would
have  to  be  accomplished.  Each  payment  systen  determines  its  ovrn
rules  for  how  a  settl-ement  failure  hrould  be  resolved.
If  an  institution  failed  to  make  settlement  on  the  CttIPS
system,  CHIPS nould  trunwindx  the  failinq  institutionts
transactions  and  recalculate  settlement,  entries  for  aII  rernaininq
participants.  tiUnwindingtr  irnplies  that  a1I  transactions  witn  tfre
failed  bank  on  that  day  would  be  separated  from  the  dayrs
transactions,  and  net  settlement  would  be  recalculated  based  on
all  rernaining  transactions.  In  the  recalculation,  some banks  that
had  previously  been  able  to  settle  night  fail  to  make  settlement
if  their  successful  settlement  had  been  dependent  on  receiving
funds  frorn  the  failed  bank.  These  affected  banks  may  have  been
anticipating  receiving  funds  frorn  the  failed  bank,  and  after  the
recalculation  of  settlement  these  banks  could  move  from  a  neE
credit  into  a  net  debit  position,  or  the  magnitude  of  their  net
debit  position  could  rise.  The  change  in  their  net  settlenent
position  could  be  larqer  than  their  capital,  and  these
institutions  would  be  bankruDt. In  a  less  extreme  sl-tuation  if9
their  net  debit  position  exceeds  their  balances  in  their  reserve
accounts,  then  these  banks  would  not  have  sufficient  liquidity  to
settle.  If  another  partj-cipant  were  unable  to  settle,  then  CHIPS
would  again  rrumrindrr  transactions  involvingr  the  newly  insolvent
banks  and-recalculate  settlement.  Thd  rin*inds  and  recalculations
would  continue  until-  a1l  rernaining  banks  could  settle  their
accounts  .
The  two  rnost  important  risks  in  the  paynent  system  are
settlement  risk  and  systemic  risk.  Settlement  risk  is  the  risk
that  an  institution  will  be  unable  to  make its  settlenent,  i.e.,
does  not  have  sufficient  funds  to  transfer  to  its  creditors.2
The  bearer  of  the  loss  depends  on  the  tlpe  of  settlement  of  the
paynent  system.  fn  a  palzment  system  such  as  Fedwire,  that  uses
gross  settlement  and  permits  overdrafts,  the  pal4nent  system
itsel-f  bears  the  risk.  The  funds  are.  final  and  irrevocable  to
the  receiver.  The  payment  system  could  l-ose  the  amount  of  the
outstandj-ng  overdraft  of  the  failed  institution.3  In  a  paynent
system  that  uses  net  settlement,  the  payment  system  has  specific
rules  for  dealing  with  a  settfement  failure.  on  CHIPS,  transfers
are  irrevocable  obligations  of  the  sendingr  bank.  The  transfers
are  considered  provisional  until-  settlement  is  made,  however,
even  a  settlement  faiLure  does  not  elininate  the  obl,igation  of
the  sending  bank.  fn  the  event  of  a  settLenent  failure  on
CHIPS,  which  has  never  occurred,  there  would  be  an  rrunvrindrr
resulting  in  a  number  of  transfers  that  are  obligations  that
will  not  be  able  to  be  settled  over  CHIPS  and  that  must  be
settled  by  the  involved  parties  outside  of  the  CHIPS  systen.1,0
A  settl-enent  fai-lure  of  one  institution  can  result  in  the
failure  of  other  participants.  The  risk  of  multiple  related
failures  is  known  as  systemic  risk.  Systenic  risk  is  not
possible  on  Fedwire  because  the  Federal  Reserve  bears  the
exposure  to  'any'loss.  On CHIPS,  however,  a  settlement  failure
could  cause  systemic  faj-Iures.  Wtrj-Ie  there  has  never  been  a
settlement  failure  on  CHIPS,  a  simulation  of  a  failure  indicated
that  potentially  one-third  of  all  participants  nigrht  fail  in
response  to  one  settlement  failure  (Humphrey  1986).
Major  concerns  about  paynent  system  risk  are  that  a
settlement  fail-ure  on  a  private  transfer  system  could  result  in
the  systemic  risk  of  multiple  institutions  failing  or  that  a
settlernent  risk  could  cause  a  substantial  loss  to  the  Federal
Reserve.  In  the  case  of  systemic  risk  and  nultiple  failures,
the  shock  to  the  paynent  systen  could  be  so  severe  that  the
ability  to  rnake  large  dollar  payments  is  disrupted.  In  this
event,  the  real  growth  rate  of  the  economy  could  be  reduced.
3.  How Large  Is  the  Risk?
The  leveL  of  risk  is  dependent  upon  two  factors:  the  size  of
the  loss  if  a  failure  settlement  $rere  to  occur  and  the
probability  of  an  unexpected  fail.ure  of  a  participant.  The
absolute  magnitude  of  the  overdrafts  and  therefore  the  potential
loss  is  staggering.  The  daity  overdrafts  on  Fed!,rire  and  CHIPS
are  sholrn  on  Chart  2.  Average  daily  daylight  overdrafts  on
Fedwire  in  Septenber  L988  were  roughly  955  billion,  and  earlier
in  the  year  overdrafts  had  been  as  high  as  965  billion.  Net
debit  positions  on  the  CHIPS system  were  $45 billion  IastChart  2
Overdrafts,  By  Transfer  System
+-  Effective  Date  ol policv
SOURCE:  Board  of  Governors  ol  the  Federal  Reserve  Svstem11
Septenber,  relatively  close  to  their  high  for  the  year  of  nearly
$48 bill  ion.
The  l-evel  of  total  overdrafts  is  not  necessarily  the  nost
accurate  measure  of  the  risk  exposure  of  the  payment  system  or  of
the  Fedrs  likely  loss  in  the  event  of  a  failufe.  If  a  single
failure  srere to  occur  on  Fedwire,  the  Fedrs  losses  could  be  at
rnost  the  size  of  the  Iarqest  overdraft  of  any  individual
institution.4  Unfortunately,  the  daylight  overdrafts  of
j-ndividual  institutions  are  not  published.  Overdrafts,  however,
are  not  evenly  spl-it  anong  the  L,100  participants  that  typically
incur  an  overdraft  on  a  daily  basis.  As  night  be  expected,  the
large  U,S.  banks  account  for  a  disproportionate  share  of  the
funds  overdrafts  on  Fedwire  and  CHIPS.  As  shown  in  the  Chart  3,
Iarge  u.s.  banks  (total  assets  in  excess  of  g1o  billion)
accounted  for  over  40  percent  of  overdrafts  in  September  L988.
The  average  daily  overdraft  of  a  Large  institution  was  991_L
nillion.  Therefore,  it  is  fuIIy  possible  for  the  Fed  to  face  a
loss  of  $l- billion  in  the  event  of  a  single  participantrs
failure.
The  ri.sk  calculus  of  the  paynent  system  is  dependent,  not
only  upon  the  rnagnitude  of  the  daylight  overdrafts  or  the  net
debit  positj-ons,  but  aLso  upon  the  risk  of  a  bank  failing'  to
settle.  The  failure  has  to  be  unexpected  for  it  to  have  an
effect  on  settlement.  Banks  that  are  in  a  known  danger  of
failing  are  monitored  very  closely  by  the  Federal  Reserve  to
prevent  them  frorTr being  in  an  overdraft  or  net-debit  position.
The  deterioration  of  a  bankrs  financial  condition  to  the  point  of
failure  usually  is  a  slow  process  taking  weeks,  months  or  evenChart  3
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years.  It  is  hard  to  concej.ve  of  a  set  of  circumstances  that
would  result  in  a  unexpected  failure,  One  suggestion  of  such
eircumstances  has  been  the  sudden  discovery  of  embezzlement  or
massive  fraudr  though  a  fraud  of  that  magnitude  is  hard  to
irnagine  . 5
The  simulations  of  settlernent  failures  offer  strong  evidence
that  if  a  settlement  failure  were  to  occur  on  cHIPs,  the
possibility  of  a  systemic  failure  of  other  participants  would  be
a  1ike1y  outcome.  Furthermore  the  nagnitude  of  the  nunber  of
participants  and  their  dollar  volume  of  electronic  funds
transfers  would  be  so  large  as  to  create  a  serious  problem.  The
very  ability  of  the  payment  mechanisrn  to  carry  ouf  its  function
is  questioned.  If  the  settlement  failure  were  Eo  oecur  on
Fedwire,  then  systemic  risk  is  not  an  issue.  StiLl-,  the  Fed
could  incur  a  substantial  loss.
4.  Current  Policies  for  Reducing  Risks
The  current  policies  for  reducing  risks  in  the  payrnent
system  are  based  on  several  Iirnits  on  the  size  of  overdraft  or
net  debit  pos j-ti.ons  ,  These  linits  ,  often  ref  erred  to  as  rtcaps, rr
are  placed  on  the  overdraft  or  net  debit  position  resulting  from
funds  transfers,  but  do  not  apply  to  the  daylight  overdrafts
that  result  frorn  transactions  on  the  Fedwire  transfer  system  for
book-entry  securities  for  reasons  described  in  section  two
above.
The  Federal-  Reserve  requires  any  private  )-argre dollar
payment  systems  that  utilizes  the  Fedts  net  settlernent  service  to
establish  bilateral  net  credit  limits  and  a  nethrork  cap  on  the
size  of  the  net  debit  position.  The  bilateral  net  credit  linits13
refer  to  the  maxinurn  net  credit  position  one  specific
participant  will  extend  to  each  of  the  other  participants.  On
CHIPS,  thj-s  bilateral  lirnit  is  set  by  each  participant  for  every
other  participant.  In  addition,  there  is  a  network  net  debit
cap  that  sets  a  marinun  net  debit  position  for  ehch  participant
in  the  network.6  In  the  event  of  a  participant  failing  to
settl-e,  the  net  debit  cap  linits  the  magnitude  of  the  loss  that
the  payment  system  must  absorb,  and  the  bilateral  net  credit
linits  sets  a  maximum exposure  to  Loss  for  each  participant.
In  addition  to  these  linits  on  the  private  payment  systems,
the  Federal  Reserve  has  establ-ished  a  cross-system  cap  which  is
the  cap  on  the  net  dayliqht  debit  position  of  each  participant.
It  is  essentially  the  sum of.  the  net  debit  positj-on  on  CHIPS  and
the  daylight  overdraft  position  on  Fedwire.  The  cap  is  a
nultiple  of  the  depository  institutionrs  capital  position,  and
the  rnultiple  is  based  on  a  self-assessnent  by  the  institution  of
its  ability  to  manage  the  payment  system  risk.
Final-Iy,  the  Fed  requires  a  cap  on  daylight  overdrafts  on
the  Fedwire  system.  This  cap  is  essentially  the  same  as  the
network  net  debj-t  cap  on  the  CHIPS  systen.  The  Fed  calculates
this  cap  as  the  cross-system  cap  less  the  net  debit  position  on
private  payrnent  systems.  T
Thus,  there  are  essentj-ally  four  caps.  There  are  tlro
netlrork  net  debit  caps,  one  for  Fedwire  and  one  for  CHfpS.  These
tr^to caps  linit  the  exposure  of  each  of  these  palanent  systens  to
any  one  institutionrs  use  of  intraday  credit.  There  j-s  also  a
cross  systern  cap  that  limits  the  exposure  of  the  combined
payment  systerns  to  any  one  institutionrs  use  of  intraday  credj.t.t-4
Finally,  there  are  bilateral  net  credit  lirnits  designed  to  lirnit
systemic  risk  by  restricting  the  exposure  of  each  indivldual
instituti.on  to  intraday  credit  use  of  other  participants  in  the
private  payrnent  system.  This  bilateral  credit  lirnit  is  not
needed  in'the'Fedwire  system  since  there  is  no  systenic  risk  in
Fedwire  since  funds  transfers  are  considered  final  at  the  tine  of
transfer,  i.  e.  gross  settlement.
5.  Enforcement  of  the  caps
The  existence  of  the  caps  would  be  of  little  importance  or
effectiveness  unless  a  system  of  enforcement  was  in  place.  In
rnonitoring  compliance,  CHIPS  currently  i6  more  advanced  than
Fedwire  in  lirniting  risk  exposure.  cHIpS  nonitors  net  debit
positions  on  a  real  tine  basis.  Any  attempt  to  6end  a  transfer
through  CHIPS  that  would  violate  either  a  net  debit  cap  or  a
bilateral  credit  lirnit  is  rejected.  Fedirire,  by  contrast,  is
monitored  on  a  real  time  basis  for  some  institutions  and  on  an  94
post  basis  for  the  majority  of  institutions.S  Transfers  that
htould  result  in  exceeding  the  overdraft  limit  are  not  rejected
for  those  institutions  monitored  on  an  ex  post  basis.  It  is
only  after  the  fact  that  the  Fed  counsels  a  participant  on  its
excessive  use  of  daylight  overdrafts.  The  tirnitations  of  ex  post
nonitorinq  are  particul-ar1y  troublesome  given  the  prenise  that
the  greatest  risk  to  the  payrnent  system  hrould  result  from  an
unexpected  failure  of  a  participant.  Ex  post  monitoring  would
provide  no  useful  inforrnation  on  the  day  that  an  institution  is
building  a  large  dayliqht  overdraft  and  j-t  unexpectedly  failed.
Daylight  overdrafts  resulting  frorn  the  transfer  of
securities  on  the  Fedwire  book-entrv  securities  are  not  sub'i ectt-5
to  caps  but  have  been  restricted  in  other  lrays. The  greatest
risk  that  occurs  is  the  transfer  of  book-entry  securities  to
buil-d  a  position.  To  filt  a  particular  order,  a  dealer  needs  to
deliver  a  large  bl-ock  of  securities,  The  dealer  acquj-res  the
securities  throughout  the  day,  and  each  transaition  increases  the
dealerrs  daylight  overdraft.  At  the  end  of  the  day,  the  dealer
delivers  the  large  block  of  securities  and  receives  payroent  that
covers  its  overdraft  position.  Pri.or  to  January  1988,  it  $ras not
pernitted  to  deliver  a  partial  order,  so  dealers  were  required  to
build  the  entire  position  before  the  transfer  to  the  final
recipient  and  the  covering  of  the  overdraft  could  take  place.  To
rnininize  the  daylight  overdraft,  the  Federal  Reserve  has
restricted  the  maximum size  of  a  transfer  to  950 milIion,  which
effectively  rnandated  partial  delivery  of  the  larger  orders.  As  a
result,  the  dealer  can  make  several  partiat  deliveries  during  the
day  and  receive  partial  payments  that  reduces  their  daylight
overdraft.  9
6.  Hoyr Effective  Have  These  Risk  Reduction  policies  Been?
Before  the  effectiveness  can  be  judged  empirically,  the  date
of  the  inplernentation  of  the  caps  on  overdrafts  and  net  debits
needs  to  be  determined.  The  effective  date  of  the  risk  reduction
poLicy  implementation  is  not  a  clear  issue.  By Uarch  L986,  the
Fed  required  a1l  private  neteirorks  utilizing  the  Fed's  net
settlement  service  to  implement  biLateral  credit  li.rnits  and
nethtork  net  debit  caps  (Belton  t_997).  In  addition,  the  Fed
inplemented  the  cross  system  cap  at  this  tj-me,
In  actuality,  the  private  sector  implemented  the  Federal
Reservets  mandated  risk  reduction  program  prior  to  the  tineL6
mandated  by  the  Federal  Reserve.  CHIPS  established  bilateral
credit  caps  in  october  L984.  one  year  later,  and  five  months
before  the  Board  required  it,  CHfpS  inplemented  a  network  net
debit  cap.
A  simple  "rneasure  of  effectiVeness  is  the  reductj-on  in
overdrafts  that  occurred  foll-or^ring  the  inplementation  of  the
caps.  The  following  table  reports  the  average  level  of
overdrafts  on  each  transfer  system  before  and  after  the  date  of
irnplementation.  The  October  1985  date  shoul-d  only  affect  the
CHIPS systen.10  There  was  a  substantiaL  reduction  of  $7.3
billion  in  overdrafts,  a  15.4-percent  decline,  on  the  CHfpS
network  following  the  imposition  of  -net  debit  caps.  After  Uarch
L986.  following  the  irnposition  of  caps  on  the  Fedtrire  system  and
cross  system  caps,  daylight  overdrafts  did  not  decline  on
Fedrrire.  It  appears  that  the  use  of  caps  has  not  had  a
substantial  effect  on  reducing  overdrafts  on  the  Fedwire  systen,
but  it  may  have  an  effect  on  the  CHIPS  system.  The
inpletnentation  dates  are  sufficiently  close  to  make  it  difficult
to  attribute  the  decline  in  CHfps  overdrafts  to  either  the  CHIPS
impLenentation  of  net  debit  caps  or  the  Fed  inplenentation  of
overdraft  caps  and  cross  system  caps.  If  the  comparison  is  made
bet\.teen  the  level  of  overdrafts  currently  and  prior  to  the  Fedts
implenentation  of  caps,  overdrafts  have  not  been  reduced  on
Fedr{ire.  As  sho!'rn  in  Tabl-e  1,,  overdrafts  are  59 . 4  billion
higher  now  than  before  the  use  of  caps.  A  siniLar  cornparison
for  cHIPs  shows  that  the  overdrafts  are  less  now  than  they  were
before  March  t-986,  but  they  are  growing.L7
Table  L.
Average  Overdrafts
billions  of  dollars
CHIPS  Fed\rire
.  (funds  only)
Inplementation  Date
October  L985
3  quarters  before  47.3  46.a
3 quarters  after  40.0  49.5
Change  -7.3  2.7
March  1986
3 quarters  before  47  .7  48,5
3 quarters  after  39.5  49.L
Change  -A.Z  .6
Last  3  quarters  44.7  57.9
Change  from  average  for  three
quarters  before  march  1"986  -3,0  9.4
Source:  Board  of  covernors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System
The  inposition  of  caps  has  had  relatively  little  effect  on
the  level  of  overdrafts  because  the  current  caps  are  too  high  to
be  a  constraint  on  rnost  participants.  The  aggregate  cap  usage
rate  is  reported  in  Table  2.  This  rate  is  defined  as  the  total
of  overdrafts  on  cHIpS  and  Fedkrire  (funds  only)  as  a  percent  of
the  total  permissible  overdraft,  i.e.  the  cross  system  cap,  as  of
the  two  weeks  ending  Septenber  ZL,  LgAa.  Small  domestic  banks
used  relatively  little  of  their  caps,  only  L9.6  percent,  anc
large  domestic  banks  with  over  $10  billion  in  assets  utilized
only  4O.5  percent  of  their  caps.  If  the  cap  is  not  a  binding
constraint,  the  marginal  cost  of  incurring  additional  overdrafts
is  near  zero.  It  is  no  wonder  that  overdrafts  did  not  decline  on
Fedwire.  Moreover,  these  cap  usage  rates  are  based  on  current
caps  that  are  lolrer  than  those  inposed  in  March  l-986.  Caps  were
reduced  on  January  l-4,  l-9g8 and  May 19,  1998.t-8
Table  2.
Distribution  of  Aggregate  Funds  Overdrafts  and  Cap
Type  of  institution  Nunber  of  percent  of
institutions  total  funds
oveidrafts
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t/ For  the  two  weeks  ending  September  2I,  1988,  total  funds
overdraft  capacity  lras  $48L.5  billion  and  actual  funds
overdrafts  were  $85.7  billion.  The  table  excludes
institutions  with  negati.ve  adjusted  prinary  capital  or  zero
or  no  caps  on  file.  Such  institutions  accounted  for  about
0.1, percent  of  cross-systen  overdrafts.
The  cap  usage  rate  is  the  ratio  of  total  cross-system  funds
overdrafts  as  percent  of  total  cross-system  caps.  The  rates
reported  here  are  aggregated  for  all  banks  in  each  category.
U.S.  agencies  and  branches  of  foreign  banks.  The  cross-
system  overdraft  capacity  of  these  institutions  is  based  on
worldttide  capital  ,  Holrever,  their  uncol  lateral  ized  Fedwire
capacity  is  based  on  the  smaller  neasure  of  5  percent  of
their  U.S.  third  party  Liabilities.
CHIPS  caps  may  have  been  nore  effective  in  reducing  daylight
overdrafts  than  Fedwire  caps.  Sinilar  data  for  cHIpS  are  not
published,  but  CHfPS  caps  are  much  sma]fer  than  cross  system
caps.  Consequently,  CHIPS  caps  may  have  been  binding  for  many
participants  and  nay  have  had  an  effect  on  reducing  overdrafts  on
CHIPS.  It  is  possible  that  the  binding  constraint  of  CHIPS caps
rnay  have  encouraged  grohr-th  of  payments  over  the  Fedwire  hrhere
caps  were  not  b  j-nding.
2/
3/t-9
The  gross  level  of  overdrafts  may  be  rising  but  it  does
appear  that  the  qrowth  rate  of  overdrafts  slorred  relative  to  the
grostth  rate  of  pa]4nents.  The  level  of  overdrafts  per  dollar
volune  of  paynents  has  declined  for  both  Fedwire  and  CHIPS.  In
l-985,  overdrafts  on  Fedwire  werd  1L  percent  of  the  total
payments.  In  the  last  four  quarters  of  data,  from  the  third
quarter  of  1987  through  the  second  quarter  of  1,988,  overdrafts
were  9.2  percent  of  payrnents.  The  improvement  on  CHIPS  has  been
even  greater.  The  overdrafts  as  a  percent  of  payments  has
declined  from  1,5.4 percent  to  7.4  percent  over  the  same time
period.  (See  Chart  4.)
rt  is  possible  that  the  risk  reduction  policies  have  had  an
important  effect  j-n  slovring  the  growth  rate  of  risk  exposure.
While  the  original  qoal  to  reduce  overal.l  risk  night  not  have
been  achieved,  the  level  of  exposure  is  like1y  less  than  it  would
have  been  without  the  caps.  One  reason  for  the  reduction  in
overdrafts  relative  to  payrnents  is  that  the  imposition  of  caps,
even  if  nonbinding,  may have  focused  attention  on  the  problem.
The  ratio  of  overdrafts  to  palrments,  horrrever,  is  not  a  measure  of
risk  exposure.
A  better  measure  of  risk  exposure  would  be  to  compare  the
level  of  overdrafts  relative  to  the  ability  of  other  participants
to  absorb  losses  in  the  event  of  a  settlement  failure.  Analyzing
such  a  measure  would  indicate  vrhettrer  the  imposition  of  caps  ftas
reduced  risk.  For  the  Fed,  such  a  measure  would  be  size  of  the
daylight  overdraft  relative  to  the  Fedts  ability  to  absorb  the
loss  either  out  of  its  revenues  or  capital  account.  The  risk
exposure  of  a  CHIPS  participant  would  be  the  sum of  transfersChart  4
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received  during  the  day,  to  which  it  has  granted  its  customers
inmediate  access,  relative  to  its  capital.  Unfortunately  neither
of  these  measures  are  reported.
An  alternative  nethod  to  test  r^rhether  the  inposition  of  caps
has  reduced-rtsk  would  be  to  feplicate  thei  sirnulations  of
settlement  failure  conducted  by  Hunphrey  (1986)  using  data  after
the  implenentation  of  caps.  His  sirnulation  takes  into  account
the  capital  position  of  the  remai-nj-ng  participants.  No more
straightforward  measure  of  systemic  ri-sk  couLd  be  devised.
7.  Moral  Hazard  and  Payment  system  Risk:  Who really  bears  the
Risk?
The  current  paynent  systen  continues  to  operate  with  a
substantial  amount  of  risk.  overdraft  levels  are  high  and
risj-ng.  Current  caps  are  not  effectively  controlling  the  leve1
of  risk,  All  of  this  raises  the  i-ssue. of  r^rho  is  bearing  this
risk?  In  the  event  of  a  settlement  failure,  where  would  the
l-osses  be  borne?  The  anshrer  to  this  guestion  depends  on  which
transfer  system  has  the  failure  and  how  the  Federal  Reserve
responds  to  the  failure.
Consider  first  a  settlement  failure  occurring  on  Fedwire.
One  possibiLity  Lrould  be  for  the  Fed  to  absorb  the  loss  directly.
Possible  policy  responses  are  presented  in  Tabte  3.  The  Fec.
initially  Loses  an  amount  of  money equal  to  the  institutionrs
overdraft  positj-on.  The  institution  is  then  declared  insolvenE
and  the  FDIC  or  another  federa]  deposi.t  insurance  agency  rnust
deal  with  the  failure.  The  Fed  would  be  treated  as  any  other
unsecured  creditor.  Given  the  loss,  the  Fedrs  incorne  would  be
reduced.  The  Fed  returns  the  vast  najority  of  its  net  income  to2L
the  U.S.  Treasury  through  interest  payments  on  Federal  Reserve
notes.  Consequentlyr  any  reduction  to  Fed  incorne  will  Likely
reduce  the  paynent  to  the  Treasury  and  reduce  qovernment
receipts.ll  This  impLies  that  the  tax-paying  public  would  have
to  make  up  the  'short  fal,l  in  Treasury  receipts,  either  through
new  taxes  or  by  repaying  additional  bonds  floated  by  the
government.  The  final  result  is  that  the  public  would  indirectly
bear  the  cost.12
A  different  scenario  for  a  settLement  failure  on  Fedwire
begins  wlth  the  Federal  Reserve  extending  a  discount  window  loan
to  an  institutl-on  that  is  unable  to  make  settlement.  Si-nce
discount  windov  credit  is  extended  on  a  secured  basis,  the  Fed
has  changed  its  status  from  an  unsecured  to  a  secured  creditor  of
the  troubled  institution.  With  these  funds,  settlement  could
take  pLace,  Following  settlement,  the  Fed  could  call  i.ts  note
and  the  institution  could  be  declared  insolvent.  The  FDIC  or
other  federal  deposit  insurer  would  then  have  to  deal  with  the
failed  institution.  Typically  in  these  cases,  the  FDIC wants  to
find  a  buyer  for  the  failed  institution.  The  FDIC  pays  off  the
FederaL  Reservers  note  in  order  to  gain  control  of  the  collaterat
so  that  it  has  cl-ear  ownership  of  the  assets  to  be  sold  to  the
buyer.  In  this  scenario,  the  Fed  $roul-d not  sustain  a  loss.  Even
if  the  FDIC would  not  pay  off  the  Fedrs  note,  the  Fed would
control  assets  that  could  be  sold  to  repay  the  note.22
Table  3.
Does  the  Federal  Reserwe  make
a  discount  window  loan
to  the  failing  bank?
InitiaL  loss  borne  bv:
Cost  of  the  loss  is
passed  to:
If  the  loss  is  l-arger  than
tbe  FDIC can  absorb,  it  is
passed  to:
Federal  Reserve  make  a  discount
window  Ioan  to  the  failing  bank
Initial  loss  borne  bv:
Distribution  of  Losses  Resulting  fron  a  paynent  System Failure














If  the  loss  is  larqer  than  FDIC  and  publ_ic
the  FDfc  or  the  CHIps  can  absorb,  poten-  bears  the
then  it  results  in:  tiatty  ttre  costs
publ  ic
The  loss  in  this  second  scenario  is  borne  prirnarily  by  the
FDIC.  This  could  be  viewed  in  two  ways.  One view  is  that  the
loss  will  be  sma11  enough  for  the  insurer  to  absorb  the  loss  out
of  the  insurance  fund  and  the  fund  will-  be  replenished  by
insurance  premiums  paid  by  banks.  If  the  loss  were  too  larqe  to
be  absorbed  by  the  insurer  alone,  the  insurer  night  require23
additj.onal  Congressj.onal  funds.  If  this  hrere  the  case,  then  the
loss  would  be  borne  by  the  tax-paying  public.13
If  a  settlement  failure  were  to  occur  on  CHIPS,  the  Fedrs
exposure  to  a  loss  is  larqely  dependent  on  whether  it  acts  as  a
Iender..of  l.ast.resort'to  the  failinE'CHIPS  participant  or  to
cHIPs  participants  facing  sone  difficulty  in  settling  or  whether
the  CHIPS  settlernent  failure  would  cause  settlenent  failure  on
Fedwire.  If  the  Fed  extends  a  discount  window  loan  to  the
institution  failing  to  make  settlement,  then,  as  described  above,
the  loss  would  likely  fal1  upon  the  FDIC  initially  and  possj_bly
the  tax-paying  public.  Lending  to  the  failing  institution  would
avoid  a  settlement  failure  and  the  systenic  risk  j.nherent  in  such
a  failure,
ff  the  Fed  does  not  provide  a  discount  windohr  loan  to  the
failing  institution,  CHIPS wil-I  incur  a  settlement  failure.
Previous  simulations  suggest  that  a  substantial  number  of
addi.tional  institutions  will  also  be  unable  to  settle,  A  large
nunber  of  banks  rnight  close,  and  the  losses  would  be  borne  by
bank  stockholders,  unsecured  creditors,  other  CHIPS  participants,
FDfC  and,  in  al-l  likelihood,  the  tax-paying  public.  Furthermore,
all  of  the  institutions  that  were  unable  to  settle  on  CHIPS would
be  unable  to  settle  their  Fedwire  accounts.  It  is  likely  that
the  Fed  would  be  exposed  to  losses  egual  to  the  sum of  the
overdraft  positions  of  the  failed  institutions,  These  Fed  losses
would  in  all  likelihood  be  indirectly  absorbed  by  the  tax-paying
public.
After  reviewing  all  these  scenarios  about  possibfe
settlenent  failures,  j.t  becornes  clear  that  the  tax-payingr  publj-c24
is  bearing  a  great  deal  of  the  payment  system  risk  indirectly.
It  is  possible  for  the  loss  to  be  borne  by  the  I'ed  or  for  the  Fed
to  shift  the  cost  to  the  FDIC,  other  federaL  depositor  insurer,
or  other  participants  of  the  paynent  systern.  ff  the  Fed  bears
the  initial'-f'oss,-  it  witl  result  in  lower  government  receipts  at
the  U.S.  Treasury.  If  the  FDTC or  other  insurer  bears  the  loss,
it  is  very  possible  that  Congressj-onal  funding  wj-II  be  needed  to
replenish  the  deposit  insurance  funds.  In  either  case,  directly
or  indirectly,  the  tax-paying  public  may  be  incurring  the  Loss.
The  major  problem  with  the  risk  being  borne  by  the  public  is
that  the  public  has  the  least  control  over  the  level  of  paynent
system  risk.  Generally,  a  free  market  assigns  risks  to  those
best  able  to  control  risk,  or  if  that  is  not  possible,  the  risk
is  usually  assigned  to  either  those  best  able  to  diversify  the
risk  or  absorb  the  loss.  In  the  case. of  the  tax-paying  public,
only  the  last  case  nay  be  true,  A  moral  hazard  exj-sts  because
the  participants  have  relatively  little  incentive  to  control
their  riEk  exposures,  especiatly  on  Fedwire.  The  public  is
dependent  on  the  Federal  Reserve  to  act  as  its  agent  to  control
the  level  of  risk,
The  participants  do  not  do  enough  to  control  their  risk.
There  are  two  ex;rlanations  for  the  excessive  risk  taking.  The
first  explanation  is  that  there  are  externalities  in  the
extension  of  intraday  credit.  when  a  participant  increases  the
anount  on  intraday  credit  it
shares  the  increased  risk  of
all  other  participants  that
same borrower.  Furthermore,
extends  to  another  participant,  it
failure  of  that  instituti-on  with
have  extended  intraday  credit  to  the
by  extending  this  credit,  the25
participant  has  increased  the  risk  to  its  own  creditors.  These
increases  in  risk  represent  costs  that  are  not  priced  in  the
extension  of  intraday  credit.14  These  externalities,  however,
apply  to  all  extensions  of  credit  whether  they  are  intraday,
overnight.  or ^term.  loans.  Tn  most  interday  e*tensions  of  credit,
the  lender  restricts  holr  much  additional  credit  the  borrower  can
obtain.  These  restrictions  are  typical-ly  referred  to  as  loan
covenants,  and  the  violation  of  a  loan  covenant  perrnits  the
lender  to  either  renegotiate  or  withdran  the  1oan.  In  the  case
of  increased  risk  borne  by  the  creditors  of  a  palrment  system
partj-cipant  that  extends  additional  credit,  the  creditors  could
act  to  control  the  risk  taking  of  the  participant.  A  simp1e
approach  would  be  for  a  bank  to  set  a  bilateral  net  credit  linit
for  other  participants  and  to  establish  covenants  whose
violation  rnrould change  the  bilater:al  lirnit.  The  covenants  night
be  a  limit  on  the  total  net  debit  position  of  the  intraday
borrower.  Essentially,  rules  that  exist  on  CHIPS nay  reflect  an
attempt  to  deal  with  the  above  externality.
The  second  explanation  for  why  participants  in  the  wi.re
transfer  system  do  not  control  their  risk  exposure  is  their
expectation  that  the  Fed  !,!ril-  I  prevent  any  settlement  f ailure  and,
consequentlyr  any  systernic  failures.  Since  they  expeet  the  Fed
to  absorb  the  risk,  they  do  not  factor  it  into  their  willingness
to  extend  intraday  credit.  In  the  current  world  of  reg'ulated
banking,  these  creditors  often  abdicate  their  role  of  rnonitoring
risk  and  rely  on  regulatory  agencies  or  deposit  i.nsurers  to
control  the  risk-taking  behavior  of  payrnent  systern  participants.
The  regulatory  aqeneies  or  the  insurer  typically  lirnit  the  risk26
through  regulation  and  exarnination  to  insure  that  regulations  are
followed.  This  is  analogous  to  uninsured  depositors  of  large
banks  expecting  the  federal  deposit  insurer  to  handLe  any  failure
with  a  purchase  and. assumptj.on  transaction  that  will  Ieave  them
whole.  Consequ'ently;  these  depositors  are  not  rnotivated  to
control  their  risk.
In  the  case of  either  externalities  or  expectations  of  a
government  bai.lout,  participants  do  too  little  to  control  their
risk  because the  marginal  cost  to  society  of  an additional  dolLar
of  intraday  credit  is  much higher  than  the  expected  marqinal  cost
faced  by  the  participant  extendi-ng  the  credit.  It  appears  that
nany  participants  treat  the  rnarginal  cost  as  near  zero  if  their
overdraft  cap  is  not  binding.  Even the  cost  of  exceedinlt  a  cap
nay  be  too  low  if  the  narginal  cost  is  being  rcounseledt'  by  the
Fed.  As discussed  earlier,  the.current  caps are  typical]y  not
binding  for  nost  participants.  The caps  set  an upper  linit  for
risk  exposure  but  do  litt1e  to  reduce  risk  bel-ow this  upper
l init.
8.  Reforming  the  Pa)rment system
The  key  to  reducing  palmrent systern  risk  is  to  restructure
the  current  payment  system  in  a way that  shifts  the  costs  of  the
risks  to  those  participants  that  are  best  able  to  reduce  the
level  of  risk.  The Fed  is  currently  exploring  policies  that  will
raise  the  rnarginal  cost  of  the  risk  to  the  participant  to  a  level
closer  to  the  narginal  social  cost  of  the  actual  risk.  The Fed
has  explored  the  possibility  of  irnposing  a  cost  on  the  extension
of  intraday  credit  and has  discussed  the  theoretically  optimal
level  of  such  credit.  Pricing  dayl-ight  overdrafts  could  have27
substantial  effects  on  reducing  risk  because  there  are  numerous
instj-tutional  changes  that  are  relatively  easy  to  adopt  that
would  lower  risks.  Anong  these  are  extending  naturities  on
federal  funds  borrowing  to  severaL  days,  utilizing  continuing
contracts  or-'rollover  contracts  on  federal  funds,  and  netting  by
novation.15  The  Fed  has  estimated  that  if  these  institutional
changes  were  adopted,  daylight  overdrafts  could  be  nearly
el iminated.
Pricing  daylight  overdrafts  is  intuitively  appeal  ing,
especially  for  economists  who  believe  that  once  an  appropriate
'pri'ce  is  set,  agents  wil-1  behave  in  an  optinizing  rnanner.  I
suggest  that  the  Fedrs  price  for  daylight  overdrafts  llliIl  be
unlikely  to  achieve
systern  risk.  There
optimal  solution  in  the  case  of







be  abLe to  set  a  price  that  appropriately  equates  the
social-  cost  with  the  perceived  private  marginat  cost.
deviation  between  these  two  costs  will  result  in  either  too  high
or  too  low  a  level  of  daylight  overdrafts.
Several  suggestions  for  pricing  daylight  overdrafts  have
been  made.  One was  to  price  daylight  overdrafts  at  the  same price
as  intraday  credit  extended  by  banks  to  security  dealers.  This
is  appealing  because  it  is  a  market  set  price  for  intraday
credit.  An  alternative  suggestion  was  to  price  daylight
overdrafts  at  the  same  rate  as  federal  funds  adjusted  for  the
duration  of  the  overdraft  position,  white  this  would  be  nore
technically  difficult,  it  would  act  to  discourage  both  the  size
and  the  duration  of  overdrafts,  One key  advantage  of  both  these
pricing  schemes  is  that  both  atternpt  to  tie  the  price  for2A
daylight  overdrafts  to  a  price  determined  in  the  marketpl-ace.
Both  of  these  pricing  schenes,  however,  have  their  flaws.16
Settinq  the  correct  price  for  daylight  overdrafts  would  be
nearly  inpossible  for  the  Federal  Reserve.  The  above  suggestions
are  reasonabl€  first  attenpts  to  set  air  aVerage  price  that  night
be  relatively  close  to  correct,  but  these  suggested  pricingt
schemes  offer  nothing  to  detenrine  the  risk  prerniurn  that  ought  to
be  assigned  to  each  individual  institution.  Furthernore,  it  is
possible  that  the  price  charged  for  intraday  credit  to  security
dealers  and,  to  a  lessor  extent,  the  interest  rate  on  federat
frlnds,  are  affected  by  the  current  structure  of  the  palnnent
system.  Determining  the  appropriate  price  for  dayLight
overdrafts  is  an  extrernbly  cornplex  problem  for  a  government
entity.  Numerous  examples  can  be  cited  of  errors  in  pricing  that
occur  in  centrally  planned  economies.  These  errors  regularly
create  either  gluts  or  shortages  for  goods  that  are  far  less
complex  in  nature  and  theoretically  easier  to  price  than  daylight
overdrafts  .
Even  if  an  appropriate  price  night  be  determined,  the  Fed
ha6  a  history  of  not  charginq  a  market  clearing  price  on  the
extension  of  credit,  not  responding  to  chanqes  ln  the  price  of
credit  deterni-ned  in  the  marketpl-ace,  and  preferring  to  ration
credit  by  neans  other  than  price.  Discount  window  lending  is  the
interday  equivalent  of  intraday  credit  extensions.  The  federal
funds  narket  offers  an  excellent  reference  by  r,rhich  discount
window  credits  could  be  prieed,  As  shown  in  Chart  5,  the
divergence  of  these  two  rates  is  at  times  substantial  and  hardlv
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federal  funds  rate,  extensions  of  credit  through  the  discount
window  are  ratj-oned  by  non-price  means  and  the  quoted  rate  is  not
a  market-clearing  rate.  Is  there  any  reason  to  believe  that  the
Fed  would  do  a  better  job  of  pricingr  intraday  credit  than  it
currently'-does  for  pricing  interday  credit?
As  an  alternative  solution,  it  is  not  clear  that  the  f'ed
needs  to  provide  extensions  of  intraday  credit.  As  easily  as  the
Fed  permits  overdrafts,  the  Fed  could  elininate  overdrafts  by
mandate.  while  it  night  be  technically  difficult,  it  would  be
possible  for  the  Fed  to  establish  a  system  of  real  time
monitoring,  and  the  Fed  could  refuse  any  transaction  that  would
create  an  overdraft.  The  CHIPS  system  already  has  this
capability.  This  approach  \rould  create  a  market  for  intraday
federal  funds.  As  a  result  of  such  an  approach.  the  public  would
no  longer  bear  the  risk  of  loss  resuLting  from  a  settlement
failure  because  there  hrould  a1way6  be  sufficient  funds  for
settlement  since  overdrafts  would  not  be  pernitted.  since  there
would  likely  be  extensions  of  credit  through  the  intraday  federal
funds  rnarket,  participants  j-n  the  palnnent  system  wouLd  have  as
much  incentive  to  monitor  their  risk  as  they  currently  do  in  the
federal  funds  market.17
one  concern  about  such  a  mandate  would  be  the  effect  on
monetary  policy  of  the  tremendous  increase  in  dernand  for
reserves.  Whil-e  an  increase  in  reserves  night  be  needed,  the
mandate  for  zero  overdrafts  could  be  phased  in  by  lowering  the
caps  slowly  over  time  until  they  are  zero.  Furthermore,  such  a
managTed  shock  to  the  denand  for  reserves  is  likely  to  be  far  more
predictable  than  the  shock  to  the  financial  systern  in  the  event30
of  a  settlement  failure,  especially  if  it  were  to  result  in
systemic  failures.
9.  Summary and  Conclusions
Riek  within  the  paynent  systern  is  perceived  to  be  a  serious
problem;  ' however,  ttrere  is  a  lack  of  hard  ellpificiil  evidence  to
measure  the  actual  risk  exposure.  There  has  never  been  a
settlement  failure.  While  large  banks  have  failed,  none  of  these
failures  have  been  so  cornpl-eteLy  unexpected  as  to  have  occurred.
in  a  single  day  preventing  regulators  from  controlling  their
risk-taking  in  the  palnnent  system.  Currently,  overdrafts  are
neasured  either  absolutely  or  reLative  to  the  volume  of  payments.
In  actuaLity,  it  would  be  better  to  measure.the  overdrafts
relative  to  the  capital  available  to  absorb  the  risk.  Fina]ly,
the  likelihood  of  systemic  faiLure  following  a  settlement
failure  has  not  been  measured  since  the  inposition  of  bilateraL
credit  caps,  net  debit  caps,  and  cross  systern  caps.
The  imposition  of  caps  appears  to  have  had  some  effect  but
is  not  solving  the  problen.  Currently,  caps  are  too  high  to  have
a  binding  effect  on  the  najority  of  participants  in  the  paynent
systems.  Slnce  caps  were  imposed,  overdrafts  have  grown  at  a
slower  rate  than  have  total  transactions,  suggesting  that  caps
are  having  some  effect.  Total  overdrafts  have  continued  to  rj_se,
however,
Assuminq  that  there  is  a  larqe  risk  in  the  payment  system,
the  current  structure  places  a  great  deal  of  the  risk  on  the
general  public  which  has  the  least  abllity  to  control  the  level
of  risk.  In  the  event  of  a  settlement  or  systemic  failure,  the
Loss  will  be  at  least  partially  borne  by  either  the  Federal3l-
Reserve  or  the  Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation.  In  either
case,  a  large  loss  will-  affect  either  the  Treasuryrs  receipts  in
the  case  of  the  Federal  Reserve  or  reguire  an  expenditure  of
funds  in  the  case  of  the  FDIC,  Consequently,  tax  payers  are
bearing,  -at" 1east  part  of  the  risk.  The  exposure  of  the  public
shows  that  there  i.s  a  negative  externality  in  the  extension  of
intraday  credit.
The  most  direct  way  to  compensate  for  the  externality  is  to
price  it.  Currently  intraday  extensions  of  credit  are  not
priced.  The  Federal  Reserve  has  considered  pricing  daylight
overdrafts  in  order  to  encourage  the  reduction  of  these
overdrafts.  History  has  shown.that  the  Federal  Reserve  is  not
likely  to  price  the  overdrafts  at  a  rate  that.  elininates  the
publicrs  exposure.  As  an  example,  discount  window  loans  are
usually  priced  below  market  rates.  The  Federal  Reserve  could
pursue  an  alternative  approach.  First,  the  Fed  could  lower  the
current  caps  slowly  over  time  to  zero,  effectively  no  longer
pernitting  daylight  overdrafts.  This  approach  lroul-d  require  a
substantial  injection  of  reserves  and  rrould  encourage  the
development  of  an  intraday  federal  funds  rnarket,18  It  would
require  the  Fed  to  improve  its  current  computer  system  to  provide
real  time  accounting  for  al-l-  participants,  It  would  shift  the
risk  back  to  the  banking  institutions.  These  institutions  r'rould
then  have  the  proper  incentives  to  control  their  risks.19
Finally  it  would  encourage  the  devetopment  of  a  private  market
for  intraday  credit  rather  than  a  government  entity  pricing  such
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Electronic  Palnnents:  An
rr presented  at  Federal
Symposium,  williamsburg,1.  Optinal  in  this  case  refers  to  the  quantity  of  intraday  credit
v/here  the  marginal  social  benefit  of  the  last  doIlar  of  intraday
credit  exactly  equals  the  rnarginal  social  cost.  See  Board  of
Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System,  ControlLing  Risk  in  the
Pavment  svstem,  Report  of  the  Task  Force  on  contro]]ing  payment
System  Risk  to  the  Payment  Systern  policy  Conmittee  of  the  Federal
Reserve  Systen  (August  1988)  p.  26-7.
2,  Settlenent  risk  is  also  referred  to  as  credit  risk  by  sone
authors  .
3.  It  is  possible  that  the  l-oss  would  be  less  if  liquidation  of
the  failed  institution  provides  funds  for  a  partial  payment,  or
the  FDIC,  as  guarantor  of  the  failed  institutionrs  liabilities,
reirnburses  the  Fed.
4,  This  lurplicitly  assumes  that  the  failure  occurs  on  the  Fedwire
system.  If  the  failure  occurred  on  the  cHIpS  system,  there  is
the  real  possibility  of  multiple  failures  resutting  from  the rrunwind.  rl
S.Failure  to  settl-e  due  to  technical  reasons  is  not  discussed
though  it  has  nearly  occurred,  Usually  these  problems  results
from  computer  failures,  and  in  the  past  it  has  been  dealt  with  by
extending  credit  through  the  discount  window  to  permit  the
institution  to  settle.
6.  The  Federal  Reserve  Systen  does  not  specify  how  this  net  debit
cap  should  be  set.  cHIps  sets  its  net  debit  cap  as  five  to  eix
percent  of  the  sum of  a].I  bialteral  net  credit  caps  granted  to  a
participant  by  other  participants,  See  New york  Cleiring  House
Association,  Constitution  of  the  Netr york  Clearing  House
Association,  Article  VI ,  Section  3(H)  and  rRules  Governing  the
Clearing  House  Interbank  paynents  System,r  anended  ,January  27,
1988,
7.  If  an  institution  is  in  a  net  credit  position  on  the  private
transfer  -  network,  this  would  not  j_ncrease  its  net  debit  cap  on
the  Fedwire  systern  to  greater  than  the  cross  system  cap.
8.  Initially,  the  institutions  that  are  monitored  on  a  real-  time
basis  on  the  Fedwire  are  finanically  troubled  institutions  or  the
U.S.  branches  and  agencies  of  foreign  banks.  Tlre  former  are
included  because  they  are  judged  to  be  of  a  higher  risk  of
failure  and  the  later  are  included  because  the  Federal  Reserve
may  face  a  more  difficult  time  in  monitoring  the  behavior  of  the
parent  company.  The  Federal  Reserve  is  expanding  its  ability  to
monitor  institutions  on  a  real  tirne  basis,  and  it  is  now
nonitoring  the  larger  users  of  Fedwire  services  regardless  of
their  financial  condition.
9.  The  concern  about  overdrafts  resultingr  fron  book-entry
security  transfers  nay  be  rnisplaced  since  it  has  been  argued  that
the  securities  thenseLves  create  a  collateral  backing  the
transaction.  The  resolution  of  this  issue  in  the  literature  is
not  clear.l-o.  If  there  was any  effect  on the  Fedr^tire system,  it  would  have
Iike1y  been  to  increase  the  level  of  overdrafts.  once  cHIPs
inplenented  a  cap,  institutions  that  reached  a  cap  could  avoid
the  cHIPs  limitation  by  sending  transfers  on  the  Fedwire  systern'
There  is  sorne limit  to  this  because  Fedwire  irnposed sinilar  caps
only  5 months  after  CHfPS,
l-1,, In  1987  the  Federal
$  l-7  . 7  bil  I ion .  Board  of
74th  Annual  Report.  1987
12.  An  alternative  approach  would  be  for  the  Federal  Reserve  to
treat  the  loss  as  a  cost  of  providing  wire  transfer  services.
In  this  case  the  Fed  !'rould  need  to  recoup  the  loss  through  higher
prices  on  future  wire  transfers.  The  Fed,  however,  has  never
attempted  to  price  its  wire  transfer  services  in  a  rnanner  to
recover  any  of  the  cost  of  the  risk  exsposure.  Furthermore,  to
recoup  a  $1- billion  foss  in  the  year  that  it  occurred  would
require  raisingr  the  basic  price  of  a  Fedwire  transfer  fron  $.50
to  $1-8.68.  Pricing  after  the  fact  would  be  j-neffective  since  the
Fed  r.rould  sinply  lose  business  to  competing  wire  transfer
systens  .
13.  Any  belief  that  this  would
the  Bush  administration's  plan
Loan  lnsurance  Corporation.
L4.  For  a  conplete  discussion
of  the  Federal  Reserve  System,
Reserve  made  a  palment  to  the  Treasury  of
governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  system,
(Le88)  p.201,.
not  occur,  has  been  elininated  by
to  rescue  the  Federal  Savings  and
of  this  idea  see  Board  of  Governors
Controllincr  Risk  in  the  Pavment
Svstem,  Report  of  the  Task  Force  on  Controlling  Payment  System
Risk  to  the  Payment  Systen  Policy  Committee  of  the  Federal
Reserve  Systern  (August  1988)  p.  27.
L5,  Netting  by  novation  is  a  technique  where  gross  bilateral
transfers  between  two  institutions  are  replaced  by  a  new
contractual  obligation  for  transferring  only  the  net  amount.
l-6.  It  has  been  suggested  that  even  a  price  that  does  not  exactly
equate  narginal  social  bosts  riith  marginal  private  costs  would
stil-]  be  helpful  in  reducing  palnnent  systern  risk.  f  would  not
argue  against  this  sugqestion  as  a  second  best  solution.  Any
price  for  daylight  overdrafts  would  reflect  at  least  some  of  the
cost  of  the  risk  exposure  and  would  }ikely  reduce  the  pa)rnent
system  risk.
17.  It  rnight  be  argued  that  the  existence  of  the  safety  nets  of
deposit  insurance  and  discount  window  loans  reduces  the
incentive  to  rnonitor  risk.  While  this  is  likely  the  case,  it  is
an  problern  outside  the  scope  of  this  paper.
1,8.  Any  arguments  that  the  injection  of  reserves  would  make  the
control  of  monetary  policy  more  difficult  would  be  countered  by
the  argument  that  the  shock  of  a  systemic  failure  in  the  palment
systen  is  likeIy  to  produce  a  rnuch  larger  and  much  Less
manageable  shock,L9.  one possible  hindrance  to  this  solution  is  the  noral  hazard
created  by  the  existence  of  the  federal  safety  nets  of  deposit
insurance  and  discount  window  loans.  lnsurj-ng  deposits  nay
eliminate  or  reduce  risk  premiums  on deposits  and  encourage
depository  institutions  to  take  on  excessive  risk.  Thj-s  issue
and  suggested  refonns  have  been  discussed  extensively  in  the
I iterature.8801
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